Abstract-Recently, Wang et al. proposed a set of double auction protocols with full privacy protection based on distributed ElGamal encryption. Unfortunately, their protocols are expensive in computation, and are not robust in dealing with system malfunction or user misbehavior. In this paper, we propose a secure and practical double auction protocols based on a hybrid trust model, where computation load is distributed to buyers and sellers while a semi-trusted manager handles the registration phase. A prominent feature of the proposed protocol is its high robustness, achieved by using a publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme with threshold access structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, many auction services exist on the Internet that satisfies a variety of requirements. Auction protocols can be classified into two types, namely one-sided auction protocols in which a single seller (or buyer) accepts bids from multiple buyers (or sellers), and twosided or double auction protocols in which multiple buyers and sellers are permitted to bid/ask 1 for designated goods [1] . For one-sided auctions, such as English auction, Vickrey auction and sealed-bid auction, there have been many papers in the literature considering various security properties [2, 3] . However, not much research has been done regarding the security issues in double auctions.
Recently, Wang and Leung proposed a set of double auction protocols with full privacy protection [4] , in which trust and computation are distributed among sellers and buyers themselves.
Although their protocols possess good security properties, they are expensive in computation and weak in robustness. Specifically, to identify the winning buyers 1 We use the term bid for a buyer's declaration of value, and ask for a seller's declaration of value.
and sellers in an auction after the determination of the trading price, all participating buyers and sellers are required to perform a distributed ElGamal decryption.
The auction process fails even if only one seller or buyer does not contribute to the distributed decryption. This requirement is apparently too strong and therefore impractical -lost or failed buyers and sellers may refuse to corporate or drop out from the auction session early; even if all buyers and sellers are willing to perform the distributed decryption, they may be cut off from the auction session due to system or network malfunctions.
In this paper, we propose a secure, efficient and highly robust double auction protocols based on McAfee's and Yokoo's protocols. The high robustness of the protocols is realized by using a publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme with threshold access structure. In our protocols, the computation related to the determination of winning traders is distributed to all the buyers and sellers; however, a participation of a subset of buyers and sellers is sufficient for an auction session to be successfully completed. In addition, to meet most of the properties for a secure double auction, we employ a semi-trusted manager who is only trusted not to disclose the pseudonyms of participants until the announcement stage of winners.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 specifies the requirements for secure double auctions and introduces our assumptions. Section 3 reviews the necessary cryptographic primitives, and Section 4 presents our secure and practical double auction protocols. We analyze security and efficiency of our protocols in Section 5, and discuss the characteristics of TPD protocol in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 contains our conclusions.
II. REQUIREMNETS AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Requirements for Secure Double Auction
Security requirements for secure double auctions are similar to these for one-sided auctions. The following properties that are desirable in secure electronic auction systems have been identified in the literature [5] . 
B. Assumptions and Model
In most of the previous secure auction protocols, trust models can be classified into three types. In the threshold trust model, there are m auctioneers, out of which a fraction are assumed to be trustworthy [6] . The thirdparty trust model assumes a third party who is not fully trusted but does not collude with other parties including auctioneers [7] . The buyer/seller self-resolving model distributes trust to all the buyers/sellers [8] . These models might be selected based on the security requirements and the application environments. However, any of these trust models alone cannot achieve most of the properties for secure double auction.
In our proposed double auction protocols, we employ a hybrid model with the relevant assumptions. First, we distribute both trust and computation for the determination of winners and trading price to buyers and sellers themselves. With a publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme based on a threshold access structure, the proposed auction protocols work well even if some buyers or sellers do not fully corporate in an auction process due to an unstable network or malicious behaviors, so that it can achieve flexibility and robustness. Second, we make use of a semi-trusted manager who is assumed not to release the pseudonyms of participants except at the winner announcement stage or because of user misbehavior. The manager may impersonate a valid trader and illegally attend an auction using an auction ticket of other participants. However, the manager's action can be monitored by buyers and sellers, thus his misbehavior can be detected.
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
A. Signature of Knowledge
We use the signature of knowledge introduced by B. Lee et al. [9] as anonymous signature, in which they extended the signature of knowledge discrete logarithm introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [10] . (1) where SK represents both the proof of knowledge of the private key x and a signature on message m. Readers are refereed to [9] for the technical details.
B. PVSS Scheme
The proposed protocols require a publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme rather than a verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme [11] . In a VSS scheme, the objective is to resist malicious players such as -a dealer sending incorrect shares to some or all of the participants, and -participants submitting incorrect shares during the reconstruction phase.
In a PVSS scheme, however, it is an explicit goal that not just the participants can verify their own shares, but that anybody can verify that the participants received correct shares [12] . To allow for public verifiability in double auction, we employ Schoenmakers' PVSS [13] which is much simpler than other schemes [12, 14] . Readers are refereed to [13] for technical details.
C. McAfee's Protocol
The first of our proposed double auction protocols is based on McAfee's PMD protocol [15] . We first review PMD protocol. Let 
Please note the different orderings for buyers' and sellers' evaluations. We use the notation i for the i -th highest evaluation value of buyers and the i -th lowest evaluation value of sellers. Choose k so that
hold. Since for (1) to k , the evaluation value of the buyers is larger than that of the sellers, at most k trades are possible. The candidate of a trading price t p is defined as
The PMD protocol works as follows, 
is left over. It is usually assumed that the auctioneer receives this amount. In our protocol, the manager receives this amount. This protocol is proven to be dominant-strategy incentive compatible if there is no false-name bid. Since our double auction protocol prevents malicious buyers and sellers from submitting false bids and asks by non-repudiation, and removes them before the determination of the trading price and winners, our protocol is obviously dominantstrategy incentive compatible.
D. Yokoo's Protocol
The second of our proposed double auction protocols is based on Yokoo's TPD protocol [16] , which is a robust extension to the PMD protocol against false name bids. We review the TPD protocol in short.
First, the auctioneer determines a threshold price r . Auctioneer is a non-trading agent who does not desire to buy or sell the goods. He determines this threshold price without consulting the declared valuation of buyers and sellers. The declared buyers' valuations are 
TPD protocol is defined as follows, 1. When j i = : the buyers and sellers from (1) Manager M -is in charge of the registration of buyers/sellers and provides each participant with an auction ticket as pseudonym. -publishes the signature scheme, the public key for verification of signature and the certificates. -announces the offer valuation range.
-releases q G which has a group of prime order q .
-on behalf of participants, verifies the proofs of buyers and sellers in reconstruction step of bids/asks, and then determines the trading price and winners according to the auction rules. -publishes the original identity of participants at the winner announcement step or because of user misbehavior. T .
-submits a bid in the submission phase, and in the ask opening phase, decrypts the encrypted shares that a seller j S has submitted.
Seller j S
-registers with the manager and receives an auction ticket j S T .
-submits an ask in the submission phase, and in the bid opening phase, decrypts the encrypted shares that a buyer i B has submitted.
In the proposed protocols, 4 bulletin boards are used, i.e., a registration bulletin board, a submission bulletin board, an opening bulletin board, and a winner announcement bulletin board. A bulletin board is a public communication channel which can be read by anybody but only be written by the legitimate party in an authentic way [9] . 
C. Registraion Phase
where e l = 0 α and n t ≤ , n is the total number of sellers participating in the auction. The buyer i B keeps this polynomial secret. Each buyer then computes shares
and encrypts them using the auction ticket of the seller, i.e., using the anonymous public key 
and sends the signed message 3 to the submission bulletin board.
In a similar way, each seller j S chooses the polynomial, computes shares and signs the message including both the encrypted shares and the auction tickets of buyers. Table 1 indicates the information published on the submission bulletin board after the bid/ask submission phase is finished 4 . 
--
E. Bid/Ask-Opening Phase
The bid/ask opening phase consists of the following four steps: decryption of encrypted shares, reconstruction of bid/ask, determination of the trading price, and winner announcement. T in the bid submission phase, and then they submitted the encrypted shares to the submission bulletin board. For decryption of encrypted shares, the seller 0 S first confirms whether her auction ticket exists in the messages that the buyers submitted to the submission bulletin board.
Decryption of Encrypted
After checking the integrity of her own auction ticket, she verifies the correctness of the auction tickets x and 0 r as follows: 3 The buyer i B should prove the correctness of the encrypted shares using the methods such as Chaum's proof of equality of discrete logarithm [11] or DLEQ protocol [13] . 
Now, consider the decryption for the encrypted shares of sellers in a generalized case. Like the seller in the previous example, each buyer i B verifies the messages and auction tickets of sellers and decrypts the shares encrypted by them. Then he signs the message
and publishes it on the opening bulletin board.
Reconstruction of Bid/Ask. To recover an evaluation of each participant, at least t correctly decrypted shares are needed. After verifying the messages and proofs of sellers submitted in the previous step, on behalf of participants, the manager M recovers the evaluation e l of buyer i B using Lagrange interpolation(Suppose that t sellers produce correct values for , . Because the manager holds w discrete bidding/asking prices in the system set-up phase, he can are values used to authenticate an identity. Therefore, all entities including the lost participants or observers can identify the winning buyers. In the same way, the manager releases the registration information corresponding to the winning sellers, so that any entities can identify the winners.
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, we perform an informal analysis of our protocols with respect to security and efficiency.
A. Security
Anonymity. We have assumed the semi-trusted manager who does not open the real identity during the auction process except at the winner announcement step or because of user misbehavior, while he may try to illegally attend an auction by impersonating other participants. Thus, as long as the manager does not open the real identity, the anonymity is guaranteed by the following Lemma 1. , and it does not include the identity information. That is, to recover the original ID , one has to be able to at least find the parameter y from anonymous public key r y . Since the manager does not release the public key y , the only way to break anonymity is to find the private key x from r x g ⋅ and compute
, then finally compare it with some certificate lists 6 . However, this is to solve discrete logarithm problem, and it is also too difficult to determine a correct x because another random secret number r is used.
Impossibility of Impersonation.
Since an anonymity service is provided in the proposed double auction protocol, an entity may try to illegally submit a faked bid or ask and impersonate a legal entity using the auction ticket of other participants. However, impersonation is technically impossible in our scheme, as shown in the following Theorem 1.
To induce Theorem 1, we first prove the following lemmas. Proof: It is straightforward to show the proof. Since we do not know the value of x and r from r x g ) ( by the intractability of DLP under a group that solving DLP is hard in the polynomial time and k is also random elements, the only way to get k is to find the discrete 6 We also consider the case that y and the corresponding certificate have been released in another auction, so that people have some lists related to them.
Lemma 2. If solving the discrete logarithm problem is hard under a group for the given quintuplet
.
It leads to solve DLP again. 
That is, the attacker generates c′ as follows:
From equations (9), (10) the following equations are induced: Robustness and Correctness. Even though some buyers and sellers cannot participate in or are dropped from an auction process due to an unstable network environment or their misbehavior, the proposed auction protocol still works well as long as at least t sellers and buyers among n sellers and m buyers are able to honestly attend an auction process. This robustness and correctness, which is a major property being emphasized in our protocol, is satisfied by the threshold access structure, and the evaluation of participants is obtained by using Lagrange interpolation as follows:
where
is a Lagrange coefficient and
Public Verifiability. In the proposed protocol, any one can check the validity of submitted signatures and offers from traders. This is achieved by the publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme, the signature of knowledge, and some zero-knowledge proofs.
B. Efficiency
Communication. Our protocols have very low communication overheads: one round for registration, one round for bid/ask submission, one round for bid/ask opening, one round for determining the trading price and winners.
Computation. In terms of computation overheads, we compare the proposed protocols with Wang et al.'s protocols [4] , because both schemes are based on McAfee's PMD and Yokoo's TPD protocols. Excluding the computational cost of registration, we only consider the cost from the bid/ask submission phase to the bid/ask opening phase. The computational cost is considered in terms of modular arithmetic, including modular exponentiation ) (E and modular multiplication ), (M and zero-knowledge ) (ZK for proving the correctness of private key, encrypted shares and decrypted shares. We assume that both protocols use the same zero-knowledge. Table 2 represents the total computational overheads, from which we can see the price w has no effect on the computational overheads in our protocols. As a result, our protocols are more efficient than Wang et al's protocols, especially when w becomes large, where m and n are the number of buyers and sellers, respectively.
Note that in the proposed two protocols, there is no difference in terms of computation loads even though the trading price of protocols are based on McAfee's MCD and Yokoo's TPD protocols, respectively. That is, the process for the determination of trading price does not give the computational loads buyers, sellers and manager directly. 
VI. DISCUSSIONS
We proposed two double auction protocols according to the determination of the trading price, which are based on McAfee's MCD and Yokoo's TPD protocols, respectively. The TPD protocol is the first non-trivial double auction protocol that is dominant-strategy incentive compatible even if participants can submit false-name bids [16] . However, the TPD protocol has some weakness. One limitation is that the revenue of the auctioneer becomes large compared with the MCD protocol. This fact is not desirable, since if the revenue of the auctioneer is large, the buyers/sellers are discouraged from participating in trading. The auctioneer cannot simply return the revenue to the participants since it will affect incentives of participants [17] . Another weakness is that the auctioneer may desire to make more profit by choosing the relevant threshold price r even though he cannot attend an auction process. We give an example where the earnings of the auctioneer and the number of traders change with the threshold price r .
Example1. Let us assume the true valuation of buyers and sellers are as follows. In the above example, the auctioneer's profit depends on his choice of the threshold price , r so that the auctioneer will determine the threshold price r as 3.5 to get the maximum profit. (In fact, the auctioneer can choose another threshold price r by considering not only above 3 cases but also other cases.)
In TPD protocol, since the threshold price is released after all participants have bidden, the auctioneer can choose the relevant r to make more earnings. His action can determine not only his own earnings but also the number of traders. That is, the number of traders including both winning buyers and sellers is 6, 4, 2 in cases (1), (2) , (3), respectively. Even though many buyers and sellers participate in the auction process, the number of traders can be limited by the auctioneer due to his profit. In fact, this property is not desirable because the trading price does not depend on the demand and supply of buyers and sellers but is determined by the auctioneer's profit.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented secure and practical double auction protocols with hybrid trust model under realistic assumptions, which are based on McAfee's and Yokoo's protocols. As a threshold access structure is used, even if some participants dropped out of the auction process early due to an unstable network or misbehavior, the proposed protocols are still able to be successfully completed. Our proposal satisfies most properties for secure double auction, and is relatively efficient in terms of computation and communication.
